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Abstract 
In 2014 Indonesia implemented a new subsidised nationwide universal coverage 
health insurance program where poor Indonesians do not pay to become members 
of this program, while others pay a relatively low fee.  This program has caused 
national debate as to how effective is the ownership of health insurance in 
increasing the utilisation of health services, particularly among the poor, given the 
existing quantity and quality of health services.  Utilising membership data available 
in the 2007 Susenas-Riskesdas dataset for various health insurance programs, this 
paper aims to research the impact of having health insurances on the utilisation of 
health services, by controlling the levels of quality and quantity of health services in 
the area.  This paper argues that having health insurance would increase health 
service utilisation by approximately 8 percentage points when people feel sick or by 
approximately 5 percentage points if it included those who do not feel sick.   
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Since the early 2000s, the Indonesian government has been interested in rolling out 
a subsidised nationwide universal coverage health insurance program, not least 
because of the still relatively high out of pocket expenditure as a percentage of 
private expenditure on health and the issue of inequity of health care utilisation, 
particularly for the poor, in the 2000s.  Health insurance program is expected to 
reduce this relatively high out of pocket expenditure. (Aji et al., 2013).1 
 
Out of pocket health expenditure as a proportion of private health expenditure in 
Indonesia was approximately 80 per cent between 2005 and 2008, then dropped to 
approximately 77 per cent between 2009 and 2011.  In comparison, percentages for 
Malaysia and Thailand were approximately lower at 76 and 66 per cent, respectively, 
for 2005 to 2008, and 77 (relatively stagnant for Malaysia) and 57 for 2009 to 2011.2  
Low health care utilisation, particularly among the poor, was also an issue in 
Indonesia particularly in the early 2000s.  It was reported that in 2001 the ratio of 
consultation rates for doctors among people in the poorest and the richest quintiles 
was 0.8 (OECD/WHO, 2012).  It was expected that the ratio should be closer to 1. 
 
On the other hand, several challenges in implementing a subsidised nationwide 
universal coverage health insurance program have also been so far identified, in 
particular, the supply side of providing health services. There have been some 
doubts that Indonesia will be able to significantly increase quantity and quality of 
health services, if it does decide to implement a subsidised universal health 
insurance.   
 
1  Please note that the relationship between out of pocket expenditure and health insurance is a 
complex one.  We do not discuss this relationship since it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
2  Authors’ calculation based on World Bank -  Word Development Indicators (2013) 2  
                                                        
First, disparity among levels of development in Indonesia remains high (Vidyattama, 
2013).  Particularly in less developed areas with challenging geographical conditions, 
there are concerns about whether there are enough access to health services and 
whether there is enough information targeted to the poor so they can understand 
the benefits of a subsidised universal coverage health insurance.  
 
Second, it has been argued that the provision of universal health insurance may 
potentially add more burdens to the capacity of the public health system which has 
been argued as already stretched even without the application of this universal 
scheme (World Bank, 2012). 
 
Third, the supply of health providers, especially at public side, has also been affectd 
by various economic downturns. The 1998 economic crisis had reduced the funding 
availability allocated to maintain network of health centres (hospital, puskesmas and 
posyandus) (Hotchkiss and Jacobalis 1999). In addition, the decentralisation has 
placed the administration of the formerly centralised network to the local 
government. Although some of the health centres have benefited from funding 
allocated  by its local government, many have faced issues regarding to the 
transparency in the local government management and lack of fund available in 
certain district governments (Kristiansen and Santoso, 2006). This affected the 
supply provision of public health providers or facilities.  
 
It is, hence, important to understand and anticipate the potential increase of 
demand toward the health services when universal subsidised universal health 
insurance is implemented. This paper provides such attempt to understand this 
issue.  
 
In 2014, Indonesia implemented the subsidised nationwide universal coverage 
health insurance program: poor Indonesians do not pay to become members of this 
national health insurance program, while others pay a relatively low fee.  As in all 
developing countries, this program has caused national debate as to how effective it 
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is in increasing the utilisation of health services, particularly among the poor, given 
the existing quantity and quality of public health services.   
 
Utilising membership data available in Indonesia for various health insurance 
programs; i.e. private/non-subsidised, partially subsidised and fully subsidised health 
insurance programs, this paper aims to research the role of health insurance 
membership in the decision to seek treatment at a health facility when one feels 
sick, controlling, among other factors, their accessibility and the levels of quality and 
quantity of health services in their area. This paper is also an attempt to estimate the 
impact of health insurance ownership on the utilisation of health services taking 
account their quantity and quality, regardless one feels sick or not; i.e. taking into 
account those utilising the services for preventive cares. Other individual 
demographic, socio-economic and geographical location characteristics affecting the 
effectiveness of health insurance membership in determining the decision to access 
health services will be observed as well.3 
 
There have been many studies being done on the implementation of health 
insurance in various countries. For example, in China, it has increased hospital 
outpatient and inpatient utilisation (Wagstaff and Pradhan, 2005, Wagstaff et al., 
2009). Similar result was also found in Senegal (Jütting, 2003). In Vietnam, among 
the poor in remote areas, it has not (Wagstaff, 2007; Ekman et al., 2008).  Studies 
conducted among low-income countries also found that the impact of this policy is 
not significant for certain groups in society (Ekman, 2004; McIntyre, 2007). Hence, 
there has been serious debate regarding the effectiveness of such a policy.4 So far, 
studies on this subject in Indonesia have been relatively limited.  Pradhan et al. 
(2007) assessed the effectiveness of the implementation of the social safety net 
health card program; providing free access to government health services for the 
3  i.e. this paper observes the demand-side of health services with supply-side controls in place.  True 
that there is also a supply-side issue, one example of which is low spending in terms of both public 
and private expenditure in providing health related facilities, but this is beyond the scope of this 
paper.   4  
                                                        
poor, as a response to the Asian economic crisis in 1997/98. Hidayat et al (2004) and 
Hidayat and Pokhrel (2009) analysed the impact of mandatory  health insurance for 
civil servant (Askes) and government-provided insurance scheme through PT. 
Jamsostek on out-patient visits at public and private health facilities. 
 
This paper differs from those of Pradhan et al. (2007), Hidayat et al (2004) and 
Hidayat and Pokhrel (2009) in several ways.  First, this paper investigates the impact 
of membership with regard to different health insurance schemes, whereas Pradhan 
et al. (2007) only examined the fully subsidised health insurance scheme for the poor 
and Hidayat et al. (2004) as well as Hidayat and Pokhrel (2009) only on Askes and PT. 
Jamsostek cases.  Although this paper did not focus to measure the performance of 
each scheme, this paper attempts to observe possible variations in impact of 
membership of these various health insurance schemes. 
 
Second, this paper will use the Riskedas (Riset Kesehatan Dasar or Basic Health 
Research) database 2007 combined with Susenas (Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional or 
National Socio Economic Survey) 2007.  Riskesdas database covers the whole nation. 
Note that Hidayat et al (2004) and Hidayat and Pokhrel (2009) utilised the 
Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) database, which does not cover the whole 
nation. Furthermore, Riskesdas database provides more reliable information on 
types of disease affecting household members and health service utilisation and 
includes other variables that are not captured in Susenas, which is the main data set 
utilised by Pradhan et al. (2007), but may be important when deciding whether to 
access the health services, including the travel time to the nearest health service 
provider and the distance to the provincial capital city.  
 
Third, this paper's period of observation differs from those of Pradhan et al. (2007), 
Hidayat et al (2004) and Hidayat and Pokhrel (2009).  Their period of observation is 
during the financial crisis of 1997/98, as opposed to 2007 in this paper, which can be 
considered to be a normal year.  
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There are, however, shortcomings of this paper.  Among other is the fact that this 
paper is unable to distinguish between the role of health insurance membership in 
the decision to seek treatment, when one feels sick, at a public health facility and 
that at a private health facility.  This paper also does not discuss the impact of health 
insurance membership on out of pocket health expenditure.  This paper will take 
into account these shortcomings when developing conclusions at the end of this 
paper. 
 
The outline of this paper is follows.  After the introduction, this paper briefly 
describes the development of health insurance in Indonesia, followed by some 
literature reviews on modelling health service utilisation. Then there is a section on 




2. Health insurance provision in Indonesia Health insurance in Indonesia has a long history, reaching back into the colonial period when insurance companies provided insurance policies to middle income earners and organisations such as labour unions established mutual health insurance plans for members. Such forms of health insurance were continued after independence in 1945 (Soedjono 1956). The first major government attempt to introduce health insurance for public servants took the form of Asuransi Kesehatan (Askes) in 1968, as Table 1 shows.5 
 
 
In 1969, the Health Fund (Dana Sehat) program, operating under a micro-finance 
scheme was introduced by several community organisations and was supported by 
the government to provide a kind of health insurance for its members. It replaced 
the unsuccessful Sickness Fund (Dana Sakit) program.  Despite the government’s 
5 Prior to the 1968, there were already private health fund schemes, mostly by labour unions or social organisations such as Muhammadiyah or other religious groups, and generally served middle-income earners. Nevertheless, they were not public schemes nor general schemes and only had limited coverage.  6  
                                                        
support in promoting the Health Fund program, this program was not able to take 
off as a program for the majority of Indonesia (Nugroho and Elliott, 1977).  High 
dropout rates, low quality of benefits, limited coverage, and issues of access for the 
poor were among the reasons why this program has not been successful (Thabrany 
et al., 2003).  
 
In 1992, a new community based health insurance program, JPKM (Jaringan 
Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat), was launched in parallel with the 
implementation of the Health Fund (Soors et al., 2010).  This was the Indonesian 
version of the Managed Care program inspired by the United States Health 
Maintenance Organisation Models (HMO), which combined a commercial based 
health insurance model with social aims to reach the poor population. Nevertheless, 
in practice, due to the underfunding of the program and the poor quality of the 
benefits, the coverage of the JPKM program was very low with fewer than 500 
thousand people registered as members so this program was also considered to be 
unsuccessful and was put on hold for further expansion (Scheil-Adlung, 2004). At the 
same time (since 1992), Jamsostek (Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja) was introduced to 
provide health insurance for private formal employees and employers.6  
 
In 1994, the Ministry of Health introduced the first scale of Health Card program 
covering public health centres (Puskesmas) which was targeted to the poor 
households (Johar, 2009; 2010). Nevertheless, in practice, the cards were poorly 
distributed as there were no incentives and proper guidelines for Puskesmas to 
distribute the cards to the poor. 
 (Table 1 is here) 
 
In 1998, as an effort to softening the impact of the 1997/98 Asian Financial Crisis 
among the poor, a major Social Safety Net program (SSN or Jaringan Pengaman 
Sosial) was implemented.  Part of this program is the provision of an SSN large scale 
6 Please note that there is also Asabri or health insurance targeted to police or military members. 7  
                                                        
health card (this was the second health card program) for the poor to allow them to 
receive free health treatment from government health centres Initially, the program 
was implemented using the JPKM-HMO model, with hundreds of the JPKM were 
established at the provincial/district levels. Nevertheless, most of the JPKM failed to 
perform so that the MOH took over the management of the program and distributed 
the fund directly to Provincial or District Health Offices instead.  
 
Pradhan et al. (2007), from their impact evaluation research, found that 
approximately 34 per cent of households in the lowest quintile owned the health 
cards (if we include the second lowest quintile, card ownership amounted to 59 per 
cent) and the use of modern health care among the health cardholders increased. 
However, there were also challenges in terms of the implementation of the SSN 
program including the mistargeting issue as leakage to wealthier households was 
substantial. Wealthier households in the quintiles 4 and 5 still held about 20.4 per 
cent of the health cards (Pradhan et al., 2007). Further, the transportation issue and 
its related cost also hindered participation the program by the poor.  
 
In 2004, the health card system was replaced by a health insurance program for the 
poor, Askeskin (Asuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin).  The main objective of this 
scheme was to expand the social security program coverage to the informal sector.  
Sparrow et al. (2013) have argued that Askeskin has also been considered as 
successful in targeting the poor and increased the utilisation of outpatient services 
by the poor. Nevertheless, there is evidence for a slight increase in out-of-pocket 
spending in urban areas which is probably due to an increase in relatively more 
expensive hospital care that has not been fully covered by Askeskin (Sparrow et al., 
2013).  
Askeskin was then expanded into Jamkesmas (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat) in 
2008 to also cover (some of) the near poor population.7 The program was fully 
7 It is argued some of the near poor people were covered for the following reasons.  First, targeting 
the near poor is difficult; second given that a large number of people are living just above the poverty 
8  
                                                        
financed by the Central Government and administered by the Ministry of Health with 
both public and private health providers involved. Despite its improvement in terms 
of coverage of the near poor population, for example, Harimurti et al. (2014) has 
argued that only approximately 47 per cent of the poor and near-poor households 
was covered by this program.  Although there is an increase in utilisation rates, 
particularly for outpatient services, there have also been challenges. These include 
evidence of substantial mistargeting and leakages to the non-poor (20 per cent of 
Jamkesmas beneficiaries in 2010 were in the top 3 deciles), low levels of socialisation 
and awareness of benefits, inconsistencies across regions in terms of applying 
targeting criteria and providing basic benefit package, the relatively low levels of 
financial protection and poor accountability (Harimurti et al. 2014). 
 
In addition to Jamkesmas, in several regions, regional governments also established 
a regional health insurance program called Jamkesda. Jamkesda is mostly designed 
as an extension of Jamkesmas, with the objective of covering an additional 
population of near poor, on top of those covered by Jamkesmas.8 
 
It is important to note that by the 2000s various private health insurance programs 
had also been established in Indonesia.   Major Indonesian banks such as BNI Bank, 
Mandiri Bank and BCA Bank offered private health insurance programs to their 
clients.  Private health insurance can also be obtained from several private 
Indonesian insurance companies, such as PT Sinarmas, PT Adisarana Wanartha and 
PT Tugu Mandiri.  Multinational insurance companies too, such as Prudential, Allianz 
and Commonwealth Life, have entered the Indonesian health insurance market.   
 
Based on the Ministry of Health data (2013), by December 2012, more than 163 
million people or 68.8 per cent of total population were one way or another covered 
line, a slight change in the definition of  “near poor” means a lot of people fall either in or out of the 
near poor group.  To give an idea of the numbers of people missing out, an assessment by the World 
Bank (2011) claimed that approximately 52 per cent of the poorest 30 per cent of the population 
were still without health insurance in 2010.  
8 In the next sections of this paper, these various health care programs will be included as health 
insurance; i.e. the definition of health insurance in the next sections of this paper will include health 
care, since health care is considered to be fully subsidised health insurance. 9  
                                                        
by health insurance.  Jamkesmas, covering more than 76 million people in 2010, is 
the largest health insurance provider. Nevertheless, approximately 30 per cent of 
Indonesians, mostly comprising the near poor and the poor, are still not covered by 
any kind of medical insurance.  
 
Starting on 1 January 2014, the Indonesian Government launched the first stage of 
the application of the new ‘Universal National Health Insurance’ scheme organised 
by a newly established organisation, the Social Security Management Agency (Badan 
Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial or BPJS). This new scheme will integrate Jamkesmas 
with all other health insurance programs including Askes, Jamsostek and some of the 
Jamkesda schemes. The launch of this program was based on two pieces of 
legislation. Firstly is the law of the National Social Protection System (Sistem Jaminan 
Sosial Nasional or SJSN), Law No. 40/2004, and secondly is the Legislation on the 
Social Security Management Agency (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial or BPJS), 
Law No. 24/2011.  
 
The BPJS has set the first stage of the target to insure at least 121.6 million people by 
end of 2014, while the final target of the scheme is to provide insurance service to 
the whole population (at around 240 millions) by 2019. The aim is to provide a 
comprehensive package, which includes not only curative services but also 
preventive and rehabilitative services and to cover all types of natural sickness.   
 
The calculation of the resource is complex and depends on the employment status of 
the recipients. For example, the government will provide a monthly subsidy for 
people categorised as poor. However, the employer and employee should share 5-6 
per cent wages to pay the insurance premium, while those who work in the informal 
sector should contribute self-funded contributions of 5-6 per cent of their monthly 
income (Simmonds and Hort, 2013).   
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
This paper, in general, aims to develop a reduced demand function of health 
services; i.e. a demand function that takes into account various conditions of the 10  
supply side, with particular attention to membership and the types of health 
insurance held.  The most widely cited model on this issue is the Behavioural Model 
(BM) developed in 1968 by Ronald M. Andersen, US medical sociologist (Andersen, 
1968). In the latest development of this BM, the three groups of factors that should 
be in the model are the following (Babitsch et al. 2012). Firstly is a group consisting 
of predisposing factors, which include individual characteristics such as age, sex, 
ethnicity and family type, demographic and social composition of communities and 
cultural norms. Secondly is a group consisting of enabling factors. These include 
factors such as income and wealth of an individual as well as factors representing the 
supply side of the health services such as the availability of health service facilities 
and personnel, travel time and means of transportation. Health insurance is also 
included as an enabling factor (Babitsch et al. 2012). Thirdly is a group consisting of 
need factors which are perceived need for health services, individuals’ perception of 
their need to utilise health care, and evaluated need i.e. professional assessment of 
patients’ health status and the need for care. 
 
In implementing this model, other researchers also add other determinants or 
differently modify the model.  One of the common additional determinants is spatial 
region/location of residence. Pradhan et al. (2007) argued the importance of this 
determinant due to, in their case, systematic differences between regions in the 
allocation of health insurance coverage (health card) and health care funding.  The 
importance of spatial location is also the focus of Erlyana, Damrongplasit and 
Melnick’s study on utilisation of health services (Erlyana et al., 2011). 
 
A modified version of the BM, for example, was conducted by Lopez-Cevallos and Chi 
(2010) for Ecuador. In their work, they developed need factors based on individual 
responses when having health problems during a certain period and on how many 
health problems were mentioned in the past. They also divide utilisation of health 
care services into preventive care (for example, if an individual has visited a physician 
for a preventive appointment in the last 30 days) or curative care (for example, 
whether or not an individual has visited a physician for a curative appointment in the 
last 30 days or has been hospitalised in the last 12 months.  11  
 Another modification is to extend the implementation of the model for other 
analysis.  For example Jütting (2003) who analyses the impact of a community-based 
health insurance scheme for the poor in rural Senegal, not only uses a similar 
approach as the BM for health care use, but also for health care expenditure.  A 
similar extension was conducted by Sparrow et al. (2013) for an Indonesian case.  
They observed the determinants of utilisation of outpatient facilities (number of 
visits in last month) at public and private health care providers, out of pocket health 
spending, and incidence of catastrophic spending defined as health spending that 
exceeds 15 per cent of total household spending. 
 
A different approach was taken by Ensor and Cooper (2004).  They indirectly 
examine the determinants of the utilisation of health care through identifying its 
barriers from the supply and demand sides of health services. The supply side 
includes input prices covering the cost of staff, capital equipments and buildings, 
knowledge of treatment technology and management efficiency. The demand side 
includes cover prices (which are official and unofficial charges, travel costs and 
opportunity costs of lost work), household characteristics (including incomes and 
level of education), cultural characteristics, and knowledge of health care available. 
 
In estimating these health service utilisation models, the most common issues 
mentioned are self-selection and endogeneity issues.  The self-selection issue is due 
to the fact that, most of the time, non-sick people are not included in the regression 
sample (Jutting, 2003).  The endogeneity issue is due to a possible reverse causality 
direction between insurance holders and demand for health care (Sparrow et al., 
2013). Also people who join a health insurance program might have unobservable 
characteristics, which will make them more likely to join the program and might 
influence the decision to use a health care service (Walker, 1999).   
 4. Model Specification and Data Sources 
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To research the role of health insurance membership in the decision to seek 
treatment at a health facility when one feels sick, this paper utilises a version of the 
BM specified in the following conditional probit model: 
 Pr(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝐏𝐏𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃𝒑𝒑 + 𝐄𝐄𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃𝒆𝒆 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖   (1) 
 
where Pr(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 1) is whether or not a person utilised a formal health service 
(Pr(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1)) , given he/she felt sick (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 1) last month. Being an outpatient (or 
“berobat jalan” in Indonesian) in the previous month is the binomial variable 
representing utilising formal health services.  For estimating the equation (1), this 
paper limits its sample to include only those reporting feel sick last month.  
 
𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 is whether or not an individual i owns any health insurance or is covered by a 
health care program.  This is the main variable of interest in this paper. It is a 
binomial variable. 𝐏𝐏𝒊𝒊 is a vector of predisposing variables covering factors such as  
age, sex, marital status, number of family members and education level. 𝐄𝐄𝒊𝒊 is a 
vector of enabling variables which include factors such as  employment status, 
household food expenditure as a proxy of income and variables representing 
physical access and the condition of the supply sides of health services.  Several 
geographical variables are included as an effort to control the quality of the supply 
side of health services in the area, which are factors such as the time needed to get 
to the nearest medical centre, Gross Regional Product (GRP) per capita in the 
resident’s district, local government health budget per capita, distance from the 
district to provincial capital cities as well as dummies for the island of the resident.  
 
This paper is also interested to observe the role of health insurance membership in 
the decision to utilise health services regardless one feels sick or not; i.e. to include 
utilising health services for preventive activities such as vaccination. If information 
on whether or not a person utilised a formal health service last month, even he/she 
did not feel sick last month, is available in the 2007 Susenas-Riskesdas dataset, the 
model to be estimated using the whole sample is: 
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Pr(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1 ) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝐏𝐏𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃𝒑𝒑 + 𝐄𝐄𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃𝒆𝒆 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖   (2) 
 
Susenas and Riskesdas surveys, however, only asked whether or not a person utilised 
a formal health service last month, if the person reported that he/she felt sick last 
month.  To overcome this missing information, the following two approaches are 
taken.  First, correcting the selection bias issue in estimating equation (1) using only 
those reporting feel sick last month with the Heckman correction procedure to the 
whole sample (Heckman, 1979). This paper uses the existence of a widespread 
outbreak of an infectious disease in a village as the main instrument to predict 
whether or not someone in the village will be reporting feel sick last month.9  If the 
instrument is strong, 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻 should be a good enough parameter in representing the 
impact of health insurance membership in the decision to utilise health services 
regardless one feels sick or not. Second, this paper re-estimates equation (1) the 
whole sample; i.e. including those not reporting feel sick last month. This procedure 
is equal to estimating the following joint probit model using the whole sample:  
 Pr(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1 ∩  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 + 𝐏𝐏𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃𝒑𝒑 + 𝐄𝐄𝒊𝒊𝛃𝛃𝒆𝒆 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖  (3) 
 
Assuming that Pr(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1) ≈ 1 (i.e. given the person is utilizing health 
services last month, the person is most likely reporting feel sick last month), implies Pr(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1 ∩  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 1) ≈ Pr(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1 ). 10 This is not a bad assumption since visiting a 
health centre for preventive care is not yet that common in Indonesia.  
 
The main dataset for this paper came from the Indonesian Socio-Economic Survey 
(Susenas), an annual national survey conducted since 1963 that includes data on 
both the household (such as size of household, household expenditure and type of 
housing and amenities) and the individual (such as education level, employment 
status, sex and age). This paper utilises data from the Core Susenas module of 2007, 
9  The empirical results of this paper show that a widespread outbreak of an infectious disease is a 
valid instrument as its correlation with the error term of the main equation estimated is relatively 
insignificant (i.e. less than 1 percent). 10  Note that 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1 ∩  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1) .𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 1 ) 14  
                                                        
since its 280 thousand sample households are also the sample for the 2007 basic 
health survey (Riskesdas) based on interviews with the heads of households 
(Ministry of Health, 2008).  Therefore, the two databases can be merged and provide 
a better picture of the condition of Indonesian households and individuals especially 
in relation to health. At the individual level, the database for this paper contains, in 
total, 856,592 observations.  Considering the way the samples for Susenas and 
Riskesdas were constructed and the size of these samples, it can be argued that the 
dataset utilised in this paper is representative of the country’s general population. 
 
The ability to merge the 2007 Susenas and Riskesdas datasets is the main reason not 
to utilise the latest available Susenas dataset, which is from the 2012 survey. The 
combination of the 2007 Susenas and Riskesdas data provides more information on 
individual health status and they are more reliable than the 2012 single survey.11  
 
The other reason is this paper would have to have a smaller data set to make proper 
use of data from the 2012 Susenas survey.  In 2012, Susenas surveys were carried 
out on quarterly basis and so much of the information is not that comparable due to 
some seasonal changes with each quarter.  This paper would have to limit its data to 
information from one of these quarterly surveys, which only contain approximately 
270 thousand individuals. Please note, nevertheless, the result from 2012 Susenas 
dataset are not much different than those from the 2007 Susenas-Riskesdas dataset. 
 
Among the many variables utilised from the 2007 Susenas-Riskesdas dataset, the 
main information of interest is on ownership of health insurance (including being 
covered by a health care program).  The dataset provides information on ownership 
of or being covered by seven health insurance groups: (1) health insurance for civil 
servant (Askes), (2) social insurance for worker (Jamsostek), (3) private health 
insurance, (4) company’s financial reimbursement, (5) health care for the poor, (6) 
11  Please note, though information on self-reported being ill and different types of symptoms is also available in Susenas, this paper utilizes those available in Riskesdas.  This paper believes the information in Riskesdas is a more reliable one.  Nevertheless, this paper acknowledges the problems with self-reporting information. 15  
                                                        
community health fund, and (7) JPKM and other regional insurance schemes. The 
Askes group also includes insurance for armed forces veterans and civil service 
retirees. The health care for the poor group includes several different schemes 
targeting people with lower income, such as Askeskin/Jamkesmas, JPKMM (Jaminan 
Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin), Health Card (Kartu Sehat) and JPK 
Gakin (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Keluarga Miskin).   
 
Furthermore the dataset also provides detail on eight types of illness. It is possible to 
choose from one or more of eight illnesses: fever, coughing, cold, asthma, diarrhoea, 
headache, toothache and other unspecified illnesses.  As mentioned before, the 
proxy for utilisation of health service is being in outpatient care or not in in the past 
month. Having different types of health insurance programs and illnesses allows this 
paper to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the impact of different types of 
health insurance/care programs on health service utilisation when one faces 
different types of illness; the response regarding being an outpatient could be 
different depending on the type of illness and the type of health insurance programs 
that one has.  Table 2 shows the percentage of health insurance ownership and 
outpatients by types of illness and regions in 2007.  (Table 2 is here)  
The first row in Table 2, it can be seen that in 2007 approximately 14 per cent of 
individuals in Indonesia were outpatients in the previous month and it is also 
estimated that 27 per cent of Indonesians had some kind of health insurance.  Nusa 
Tenggara reported the highest proportion of outpatients at 20 per cent and also the 
highest proportion covered by health insurance at 43 per cent. 
The “Not ill” row shows those reporting not affected by any illness in the previous 
month, while the “Any illness” shows the situation of those reporting feel sick 
affected by any illness in the previous month.  From this row, it can be seen that 
approximately 45 percent who reported sick in the previous month sought medical 
treatment and were treated as outpatients.  Among those who reported sick only 
16  
approximately 28 percent had any kind of health insurance.  Rows below the “Any 
illness” show the situation of those reported sick in the previous month in each 
region.  The last group of rows in this table shows the situation of those reporting 
sick affected by a certain type of illness.  For example, approximately 26 percent of 
those who had a fever in the previous month received outpatient treatment. 
 
5. Results and Discussion  
5.1. Regression Quality 
Table 3 shows the results from the main estimations conducted in this paper.  Probit 
regression is the estimation technique utilised for all estimations. The technique uses 
the maximum likelihood to cumulative distribution function of normal distribution to 
estimate the coefficients in the regression. This is one of the most efficient unbiased 
regression techniques available.   
 
The main concern with the results in Table 3 is whether or not there is an 
endogeneity bias in our estimation. There are two possible sources of this bias: (1) 
having health insurance is due to the fact that one expects to become ill (or reverse 
causality issue), and (2) omission of important variables determining health service 
utilisation which also have some correlation with health insurance ownership (i.e. 
omitted variable issue).  Related to the first source, this paper argues that this is not 
the case. First, among those with health insurance, the proportions of those who are 
outpatients are relatively smaller than those who are not (see columns (3) and (4) in 
Table 2).12  The proportion of outpatients should be much larger if there were a 
potential endogeneity issue.  The main reason for this is that, knowing that they are 
going to use health services, they become members of health insurance. 
 
Second, the majority of those with health insurance have it by default (or 
mandatorily) due to being civil servants, poor or near poor; they do not have it by 
choice.  Private health insurance is the only scheme where it can be suspected that 
12 By substracting columns (3) with (4) in row “All person”, it can be seen that the proportion of people with health insurance but not utilizing health services is approximately 21.8 percent of the population; much larger than 4.7 percent of the population having health insurances and utilising health services. 17  
                                                        
those having it might do so due to expectation of being sick now or in the future.  
However, the proportion of those with private health insurance is relatively small.  
Related to second source of possible bias, this paper put as many as possible 
determinants in the regressions. It is important to note with that this strategy does 
not entirely solve the problems of unobserved heterogeneity.  Having a panel data 
analysis is most likely a better approach to solve the problems of unobserved 
heterogeneity.  However, the dataset utilised in this paper do not allow us to 
implement a panel data analysis.  The models implemented in this paper include a 
relatively a lot of variables, they include education, household size, age, income, 
employment status and sector of employment. This should minimise the possibility 
of bias due to omission of important determinants.13  Hence, it is safe to argue that 
results in Table 3 are relatively unbiased.  
 
To ensure the robustness of the results of this paper, an alternative method, namely 
the Average Treatment Effect to those who utilise the health service using different 
degree of matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al 1997), is also 
applied. The results of this method confirm that results in Table 3 are relatively 
robust.14 
 
Models (1a) and (1b) in Table 3 shows the determinants of health utilisation among 
those reporting feel sick last month.  Models (1c) and (1d) shows the results of 
Heckman correction procedure aiming to estimate the determinants of health 
utilisation among all individuals; i.e. both reporting and not reporting feel sick last 
month.  Models (3a) and (3b), by estimating the equation (3), also aim to estimate 
the determinants of health utilisation among all individuals. 
 
Heckman (1979) argues that if having health insurance has a high correlation with 
being sick, Heckman correction’s estimation procedure will produce relatively unbias 
estimation results.  In this paper, however, the correlation coefficient between 
13  To further reduce this issue, one needs to utilize a longitudinal dataset.  Unfortunately the Susenas-Riskesdas dataset is not. 14 Results using the Average Treatment Effect are available from the authors upon reques. 18  
                                                        
health insurance ownership and being sick is only 4.85 per cent.  Furthermore, an 
application of Heckman correction’s estimation procedure produces less efficient 
estimation results as indicated by much lower numbers of log likelihood compared 
to the pure probit model in models (3a) and (3b). Hence, it seems reasonable to 
believe that models (3a) and (3b) provide a more accurate estimation than models 
(1c) and (1d).  
 (Table 3 is here) 
 
 
5.2. The Impact of Health Insurance 
It is important to note that Table 3 presents the marginal effects calculated from the 
results of the probit regressions. It can be seen from models (1a), (1b), (3a) and (3b) 
that the impact of health insurance ownership on health service utilisation is positive 
and statistically significant.  Model (1a) shows that ownership of any health 
insurance increases the probability of utilising health services by 7.5 percentage 
point when one feels sick.  When observing the results for the whole sample, 
regardless one feel sick or not, ownership of any health insurance increases the 
probability of utilising health services by 4.8 percentage point (model (3a)). 
 
Different health insurance programs, however, induce different impacts on the 
utilisation of health services (see models (1b) and (3b)).  Among those feeling sick or 
for the whole population, private health insurance, health cost reimbursement by 
company and Jamsostek increase the utilisation of health services less than the 
others. This is logical since most members of private health insurance, health cost 
reimbursement by company and Jamsostek are, in general, are better off than civil 
servants, those informal sectors and the poor. This result highlights the importance 
of subsidised health insurance to enable people to seek health services when they 
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feel sick or for preventive cares—so achieving the final goal of better health status 
for society as a whole. 15 
 
The result may not be able to confirm whether there is a concern regarding 
enrolment rate in Indonesia. In his assessment on the implementation of Universal 
Health Insurance in Asian countries, Wagstaff (2014) points out that the enrolment 
to this insurance among middle income household is often low as the benefit may 
not be felt as great. Most of the enrolment in the schemes that involve middle class 
in our study has been taken care by the employers or the institution that working 
with them. Nevertheless, the relatively high impact of the Askes and Jamsostek 
indicate that the middle income in Indonesia will be willing to utilise the health 
insurance. Wagstaff (2014) himself points out that the issue is less pronounced in 
Indonesia compared to the Philippines and Vietnam. One issue that Indonesia needs 
to face is ensuring that the reduction in out-of-pocket spending is significant but at 
least the provider payment from the insurance could be an incentive for the provider 
to improve its services (Perrot et al 2010).    
 
5.3. Other Determinants of Health Service Utilisation 
The impact of the predisposing factors on health service utilisation is arguably 
smaller than the enabling factor of the ownership of health insurance. The impact of 
age is small and single people are less likely to utilise health services or seek medical 
treatment compared to those who are married, widowed or divorced.16 One 
explanation could be that single people, who are mostly young, are more careless 
about seeking health treatment when they are sick, believing that they can recover 
by purchasing over the counter medicines.  Among general population, females are 
less likely to seek medical treatment.  When they feel sick, there is no significant 
difference between female and male. This could be the fact that Indonesian female 
15  Important to note is that in 2007, the year of this paper’s database, the owners of health insurance for civil servant, health care for the poor and community health fund can, most of cases, only use these program when visiting public health providers. The results of this paper could be different if they are allowed to utilize these programs to seek private health services, due to the fact that, in Indonesia, private health providers typically provide better services and are having superior facilities than those of public health providers. 
16 Among those feeling sick there is not much difference between single people and divorced. 20  
                                                        
feel a higher opportunity cost than males do or that Indonesian females are more 
careful in managing their money. And so they only seek health treatment when they 
are really sick, otherwise using medicines available over the counter.  
 
In estimating the impact of education, this paper uses those who have no school 
education as a comparison base. The estimation shows all education levels have a 
negative impact on health service utilisation.  Furthermore, the higher a person’s 
education is, the less likely they are to use health services when they are sick.  One 
of the explanations for this result is that the observations who have no school 
education are dominated by children especially those aged five years old and below 
whose, in Indonesian culture, would have the priority to be taken to seek medical 
treatment when they are sick due to their fragility. Another explanation is because 
their opportunity cost of using health services rises in proportion to their education 
level, and it could also mean they are more confident to treat their illness 
themselves by buying over the counter medicines. These results are also in line with 
the negative impacts of all employment status (with not working as a comparison 
base). This may indicate that the opportunity cost of not going to work because of 
sickness and using the health services for consultation instead is high. 
 
Household income, which is proxied by food expenditure, is significant in 
determining the utilisation of health services.  The richer the person, the more the 
person utilises health services when sick.  This an indication that in general there still 
could be the existence of budget constraints in utilizing health services, even among 
the poor.  Health services might be free for them, but they still have to cover the 
travel cost to reach health services from their homes. That this could be an issue is 
borne out by the fact that the farther the person is from a health centre, the less 
likely they are to utilise the health centre when sick.  
 
The quality of health services seems to matter as well.  It can be seen that the 
farther the person is from a provincial capital (i.e. the person has to go to local 
health centres which most likely provide lower quality than those in the provincial 
capital), the less likely they are to utilise health services when sick. Living outside the 21  
Java-Bali, except in Nusa Tenggara, also reduces the probability of utilising the health 
services. This may be because of the availability and quality of health services in 
Java-Bali is better than outside Java but it may also affected by the availability of 
better information in Java-Bali about the importance of seeking accredited medical 
treatment.  However, it is puzzling that those living in Nusa Tenggara have a 
tendency to utilise health services more often than those in Java-Bali when they are 
sick.  The answer could be that the types of illnesses that they typically had in 2007 
might more pressingly have required them to seek professional medical treatment 
(Pakasi et al 2009; Soenarto et al 2009).  
5.4. Users of Health Insurance 
This paper seeks to understand who uses of health insurance by adding interaction 
variables between having health insurance and various individual and location 
characteristics and observing the coefficients of the variable.  Table 4 shows the 
marginal effects of the additional variables. This is because, except for health 
insurance, the marginal effects for other variables are hardly affected by the 
inclusion of these additional variables.  
 
First this paper focuses on understanding people in regions in which people generally 
use health services when they are sick and have health insurance. Note by the 
absence of the Java-Bali dummy variable the marginal effects of different regions 
have to be seen relative to the condition in Java-Bali.  The result indicates that 
having health insurance in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi tends to encourage the 
owners to use health services more than in Java-Bali; i.e. health insurance 
companies/schemes tend to “better help” people on those island to access health 
services than those in Java-Bali.  This is not the case in Nusa Tenggara; i.e. the 
effectiveness of health insurance in increasing health in those regions is not better 
than that in Java-Bali. In Maluku-Papua, the results are interesting.  Among people 
who feel sick, people in Maluku-Papua who have health insurance tend to utilise 
health services when they feel sick compared to those in Java-Bali.  However, this is 
not the case when those who do not feel sick included; i.e. having health insurance 
does not encourage people in Maluku-Papua to do any preventive care. 22  
 Table 4 shows an insignificant positive coefficient of interaction between having 
health insurance and the time needed to reach the nearest health centre.  It means 
that having health insurance encourages the use of health service the farther the 
person is from a health centre but the effect is small.  Having health insurance does 
help those whose travel cost is high to come to a health centre when the person is 
sick.  A positive and significant coefficient for distance to the provincial capital and 
health insurance could mean that having health insurance encourages people far 
from the provincial capital to use a local health centre even though the services are 
not as good as those in the provincial capital. 
 (Table 4 is here) 
 
Related to education, in general it can be seen that having health insurance 
encourages health service usage more, the higher the level of education one has 
when sick.  On household income, it can be seen from Table 4 that having health 
insurance encourages health service usage more among people on a lower income. 
Hence, it can be seen that health insurance does relax one’s budget constraints.  
 
5.5. Kind of Illness 
To understand the kind of illness that encourage utilisation of health services when 
one has a health insurance, this paper estimates model (1a) for those reporting feel 
a similar illness.  The results can be seen in Table 5.  It can be seen that the highest 
impact of having health insurance on health service utilisation happens when one 
feels of having an asthma attack or breathing difficulty, while the lowest impact is in 
the case of diarrhea.  This is understandable since Indonesians tend to treat asthma 
attack or breathing difficulty as a more serious illness than diarrhea. 
 (Table 5 is here) 
 
 
6. Conclusion 23  
Indonesia has gone through a long history of health insurance provision, with 
expansion in terms of types and coverage.  There has been the development of  
other types of health insurance in addition to those which are intended to cover a 
particular group of employees or employers (for example Jamsostek). Since 2004 
with the construction of Askeskin, there have been types of health insurance 
intended for the poor, as one of the social assistance programs in Indonesia.   
 
A decade later, since early 2014, the Government of Indonesia further aims to 
ensure that every Indonesian will be covered by health insurance by 2019.   A new 
scheme called ‘Universal National Health Insurance’ was launched. The first stage of 
the target is to insure more than 120 million people in 2014. The proportion of the 
population holding health insurance which has been increasing over time, will be 
expected to continue to rise with this new scheme. 
 
Nevertheless, it remains debatable whether either the various health insurance/care 
schemes available now or the new single universal type of health insurance mean 
that holders of health insurance are more willing to seek medical treatment 
compared to those without.  This is the main objective of this paper.  This paper also 
investigates who are affected the most; i.e. more willing to use health services when 
sick, by the availability of health insurance.  As the Universal National Health 
Insurance has just been launched in 2014, we are not able to examine its impact in 
this paper. The 2007 Susenas data merged with the 2007 Riskesdas are the main 
source dataset for this paper.  
 
The main result of this paper is that having health insurance would increase the 
probability of utilising health services utilisation by approximately 8 percentage 
points when people feel sick or by approximately 5 percentage points if included 
those who do not feel sick.  A loose interpretation of this result is the following.  in 
2007, approximately 26.5 percent of the population own health insurance. Providing 
the other 73.5 percent of the population with health insurance means an additional 
of approximately 4 percent of the population utilizing health services; i.e. the 
number of outpatient people (in the last one month) will increase from 24  
approximately 14 percent of the population to approximately 20 percent of the 
population, or the number of outpatient people (in the last one month) will increase 
by approximately 29 percent. 
  
Among the different schemes available, private health insurance, health cost 
reimbursement by company and Jamsostek are estimated to have a lower impact on 
increasing the utilisation of health services than other health insurance schemes. 
Less likely that poorer people own these three types of health insurance.  If they 
have, poorer people are mostly among members of the other health insurances 
which impacts are higher.  This result indicates that the poor benefit more from the 
provision of health insurance. This result is also confirmed by the fact that the lower 
the household income is, proxied by household food expenditure, the greater the 
impact of having health insurance is on health service utilisation.   
 
Having health insurance does encourage those who live far away to utilise health 
services and those whose health facilities in their area are rather limited (not as 
good as the ones in the provincial capital).  Although there is some budget 
constraints remain, having health insurance does help to relax household budget 
constraints so people seek professional health treatment when a member of the 
household is sick. Hence, if the goal of providing health insurance is to encourage 
sick people to seek professional medical treatment, to perform as an enabling factor 
as discussed in the literature section, this goal in general has been achieved. 
 
The question remaining is whether increasing the probability of utilising health 
services by 5 to 8 percentage point is good enough, considering that the cost of 
providing health insurance, particularly subsidised insurance, is rather large for the 
government. This question is not within the scope of this paper, and further studies 
are needed to deal with this question.  This paper however indicates the importance 
of other factors in encouraging the utilisation of health services.   
 
Having more health centres, particularly in remote areas, and better quality of health 
services are among the policy implications of this paper.  Hence, it is clear that to 25  
encourage higher utilisation of health services to induce a better health status of the 
population, not only programs to relax household budget constraints are needed, 
but also programs to improve the supply side of health services.  
 
Indonesia’s previous experience has shown that the health care system has been 
relatively well-developed to face challenges in the increase in demand of utilisation 
of health services (such as in the case of the financial crisis in 1998). Nevertheless, 
stronger commitment not only from the central government, but also from the local 
government is required to respond to potentially more challenges in providing 
health services for everyone.  
 
These may include providing incentives to further encourage the private sector to 
provide more health services, particularly in remote areas. Balancing priorities 
among those programs is the challenges faced by the Indonesian government. 
Incremental steps with strong monitoring and evaluation processes and continued 
improvement of programs to encourage higher utilisation of health services might be 
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  Table 1. Milestones of Health Insurance Provision in Indonesia 
Year Name of the Program Target Beneficiaries Management/Organiser 
1968 Askes Both active and retired civil 
servants and direct family 
members (Mandatory) 
Ministry of Health, together with Askes 
Persero 
1969-1990s Community-based health 
insurance (CBHI) – Health Funds 
and its promotion of Dana Sehat 
 
Members of communities, 
informal sector (Voluntary) 
Cooperation, community organisation 
with leaders of communities responsible 
for establishing a structure for health 
activities and for carrying out decisions 
made by their community. 
1992 Workforce Social Security – 
Jamsostek (Jaminan Social 
Tenaga Kerja) 
Private formal sector employees 
and their dependents 
(Mandatory) 
Ministry of Manpower and 
Transmigration with PT Jaminan Sosial 
Tenaga 
Kerja (PT Jamsostek Persero) 
1992 Community Health Insurance 
Scheme– JPKM/HMOs (Jaminan 
Pemeliharaan Kesehatan 
Masyarakat) –  
Informal sector, civil servants and 
military for their uncovered 
dependents (Voluntary) 
BAPELs (managed care organisations) for 
daily application of JPKM and 
Government and local professional 
organisations. (BADAN PEMBINA) which 
monitor the implementation of the JPKM. 
The strategic unit for JPKM is the district. 
1994 The Health Card (Kartu Sehat) 
was launched to reduce 
asymmetry in access to health 
care 
Targeted poor households Ministry of Health 
1998 Social Safety Net - JPS (Jaring 
Pengaman Sosial) 
The program was not limited to 
health subsidies but also to 
cover workfare, subsidised rice 
sales, targeted scholarships, and 
village block grants. The 
program was implemented using 
the JPKM-HMO model as the 
‘carriers’ at the provincial 
/district level. 
This was the second large scale 
health card program which were 
issued to the targeted poor 
households 
Ministry of Health took over the program 
in 1999 as the organiser since most JKPMs 
established to support the SSN have  
failed to perform. 
2001 Decentralisation law was implemented 
2004 Health Insurance for the Poor– 
Askeskin/ (Asuransi Kesehatan 
Masyarakat Miskin) 
Identified poor, based on 
individual and household 
targeting 
Up to 2007 managed by PT Askes 
2004 The Law for National Social Security System (40/2004) was issued 
2008 Health Insurance Scheme for the 
Population – Jamkesmas/ 
Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat 
replaced Askeskin 
Extend the coverage to include 
the near poor, larger target 
population than the Askeskin 
Ministry of Health took over full 
management of the program with PT 
Askes still responsible for managing the 
membership 
2010 Passing of Law No. 17: The National Development Middle Plan (RPJMN) reconfirmed Indonesia’s commitment to 
provide universal health coverage by 2014  
2011 The Legislation on the Social Security Management Agency (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (BPJS) (Law No 
24/2011) was passed, which mandated that the Social Security Agency (BJPS) would be operational by January 1, 
2014 
2014 The launch of Universal Health 
Insurance  
Aims to cover everyone by 2019 BPJS 
Source: Brodsky et al. (2003, p. 146); Johar (2009, 2010);  Rokx et al. (2009, Table 3.1, p.30 ); Scheil-Adlung (2004); 






Table 2. Percentage of Outpatients and Health Insurance Ownership in 2007. 
(1) Outpatient (2) 
Own health insurance (3) 














Table 3. Marginal Effect on Health Utilisation 
  
Probit estimation of those who are sick Heckman Selection Probit estimation    dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (3a) (3b) Ownership of any health insurance 0.075***  0.056***  0.048***  
-       Health insurance for civil servant (Askes)/ veteran/ retiree  0.099***  0.074***  0.031*** 
-       Financial Aid/ reimbursement by company  0.062***  0.046***  0.026*** 
-       Health care for the poor (JPKMM/Health Card/JPK Gakin/Askeskin)  0.065***  0.049***  0.053*** 
-       Social insurance for worker (Jamsostek )  0.066***  0.05***  0.031*** 
-       Private health insurance  0.04***  0.031***  0.023*** 
-       Health fund  0.102***  0.077***  0.066*** 
-       JPKM and other regional health insurance schemes  0.081***  0.06***  0.049*** Time needed to nearest health service provider (day) -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.005*** Distance to the provincial capital city (100km) -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.004*** Region (base:Java-Bali)       Sumatera -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.004*** -0.004*** Kalimantan -0.115*** -0.114*** -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.03*** -0.029*** Sulawesi -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.007*** -0.007*** Maluku-Papua -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.010*** -0.01*** NusaTenggara 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.056*** 0.054*** Log likelihood -186042 -186030 -724806 -724794 -331223 -331133 Observations 277921 277921 848585 848585 848585 848585 
Note: All the equations include control variable for Sex, Age, Household size, Education, Employment Status, Sector of employment, GRP per capita, District Health Budget and Food expenditure as the proxy for income  *, **, and *** are 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively   34  
Table 4. Partial Marginal Effect of Variables Interacting with Health Insurance Ownership Interacting variable with health care/insurance ownership Probit estimation of those who are sick Heckman Selection Probit regression   (dy/dx)a (dy/dx)b (dy/dx)a (dy/dx)b (dy/dx)a (dy/dx)b health care/insurance ownership (constant) 0.051*** 0.023** 0.037*** 0.016* 0.037*** 0.012** Time needed to nearest health service provider (day) 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 Distance to the provincial capital city (100km) 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** Region (base:Java-Bali) 
      Sumatera 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.016*** 0.02*** 0.011*** 0.014*** NusaTenggara  0 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 Kalimantan 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.027*** 0.031*** Sulawesi  0.017*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.011*** Maluku-Papua 0.024** 0.033*** 0.017** 0.023*** -0.02*** -0.015*** Number of family member  0.005***  0.003***  0.004*** Food Expenditure (million Rp/ month)  -0.03***  -0.021***  -0.018*** Log likelihood  -185986 -185912 -724749 -724675 -331127 -330938 Observations 277921 277921 848585 848585 848585 848585 





Table 5. Marginal Effect on Health Utilisation for Each Case of Illness 
dy/dx Ownership of any health insurance Observations Log likelihood Fever 0.067*** 14670 -9675 Cough 0.058*** 11268 -6510 Flu/cold 0.054*** 12661 -5846 Asthma/ Breath difficult 0.110*** 4176 -2800 Diarrhea 0.051*** 5061 -3380 Headache 0.082*** 14111 -7980 Toothache 0.097*** 5530 -3184 Others unspecified illness 0.055*** 56241 -38284 
Note: All the equations include control variable for Sex, Age, Household size, Education, Employment Status, Sector of employment, GRP per capita, District Health Budget and Food expenditure as the proxy for income  *, **, and *** are 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively 
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